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Life cycle wages of immigrants from developing countries fall short of catching up with 
wages of natives. This disparity reflects both lower wages at entry and lower wage growth. 
Using linked employer-employee data, we show that 40 percent of the native-immigrant 
wage gap is explained by differential sorting across establishments. Our findings point to 
differences in job mobility and intermittent spells of unemployment as major sources of the 
discrepancy in lifetime wages. The inferior wage growth of immigrants primarily results 
from failure to advance to higher paying establishments over time. This pattern is consistent 
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies show that segregation of immigrants and natives across firms contributes 
significantly to the immigrant-native wage gap.
1 Immigrants from developing countries are 
more likely than natives to work in low-paying firms. This observation raises two important 
questions: What is the contribution of job mobility versus within-job wage increases to the 
overall wage growth for immigrants, and how do these two sources of wage growth compare 
for immigrants and natives? The answers to these questions will improve our understanding 
of the potential hurdles immigrants face in the labor market and provide insights into the 
economic assimilation process of immigrants.  
This paper examines the implications of sorting by ethnicity across firms
2 over time 
by means of an extended assimilation regression framework, using employer-employee data 
from Norway. We focus on immigrants from developing countries, as immigrants from high-
income source countries typically have earnings close to those of natives with similar 
education and experience (Barth et al., 2004). While the empirical wage assimilation 
literature has examined the role of occupational transitions (Weiss et al., 2003; Eckstein and 
Weiss, 2004), the importance of job mobility and the distribution of workers across firms 
over the life cycle remain largely unexplored. When equally productive workers receive 
unequal pay in different firms (Groshen, 1991; Abowd et al., 1999), for example due to rent 
sharing (Card et al., 2010), differential access to high-pay firms will generate wage gaps 
between groups.  
Job-to-job transitions are important sources of wage growth, particularly during the 
first 10-15 years in the labor market (see, e.g., Topel and Ward, 1992). We separate wage 
growth occurring as a result of seniority with the same employer from that arising from job 
mobility. We use the firm fixed effects estimator to identify pay growth within 
establishments, and track the development of establishment wage effects over time to tease 
out the part of wage growth that follows from job change. Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) find 
workplace sorting to be a more important source of male immigrant-native wage differentials 
than differences in pay within establishments. The authors also report evidence that 
workplace sorting plays a role in immigrant wage assimilation, as, at least for male 
                                                 
1 See Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2010).  
2 In our data, the employer unit is the establishment but we will use firm and establishment interchangeably in 
the text.   2
immigrants from developing countries, older immigrants have jobs in better-paying 
establishments than recent immigrants. But because their evidence comes from comparing 
recent and non-recent immigrants in cross-sectional data, the authors are unable to separate 
assimilation effects from cohort differences in establishment affiliation. In the present study, 
we draw on data covering a 10-year period, which allows us to separate assimilation and 
cohort effects (see, e.g., the discussion of assimilation vs. cohort effects on immigrant 
earnings in Borjas, 1995). In our empirical model, wages are determined by experience, or 
years since migration for immigrants, as well as educational attainment, accounting for 
immigrant cohort heterogeneity and the allocation of workers across firms.  
  Separating wage growth between and within firms, our empirical analysis sheds light 
on the relative importance of two types of mechanisms that might hamper immigrant wage 
progress. The first mechanism is statistical discrimination based on lack of information on 
part of employers, while the second is monopsonistic discrimination due to limited 
information on part of employees.
3 
In a search framework, gains from job mobility depend on opportunities for new jobs 
in terms of job arrival rates and wages, as well as the frequency of job destruction 
(separations). First, statistical discrimination may limit the arrival rate of favorable job offers 
because, at the stage of hiring, employers are less precisely informed about the productivity 
of immigrant applicants compared to natives. Such information asymmetries and even self-
fulfilling expectations would imply that immigrants reap smaller gains from job mobility 
than natives, while their within-firm wage profile should be steeper as the current employer 
gains information about true worker productivity (see, e.g., Oettinger, 1996; Farmer and 
Terrell, 1996). Consistent with these predictions, Bratsberg and Terrell (1998) document that 
young black men in the United States earn lower returns to general experience but at least as 
high returns to firm-specific seniority as do young white men. If statistical discrimination 
were important, we would expect wage growth of immigrants primarily to take place within 
firms. As employers have little incentive to reveal their knowledge to other firms, immigrants 
will have smaller expected gains from wage increments related to job mobility.  
                                                 
3 An example of how monopsonistic discrimination may prevail in the labor market is given by Bowlus and 
Eckstein (2002), who consider a situation where some employers have discriminatory tastes. Barth and Dale-
Olsen (2009) develop a model of monopsonistic discrimination to explain the gender wage gap.   3
Secondly, wage gains from job change depend on the nature of the separation. An 
involuntary job shift is likely to lead to a less favorable new job than a voluntary move, 
simply because the floor provided by the current wage disappears when the separation is 
involuntary. Group differences in gains from mobility will thus depend on the relative 
intensity of job losses and job options. The negative effect of limited outside options will be 
amplified in a situation where immigrants face a higher probability of job loss than native 
workers. Examples of mechanisms that could provide exactly such a situation are 
employment under “last in, first out” (LIFO) rules and immigrants being more likely to take 
on high-risk jobs in the first place. The combination of statistical discrimination, LIFO, and 
uncertain jobs may create a regime where immigrants are trapped in bad jobs.  
  An alternative candidate for explaining differential wage growth between natives and 
immigrants is monopsonistic discrimination arising from informational frictions. When 
immigrants are less informed about outside job opportunities, there is less need for employers 
to give pay raises to avoid turnover.  However, this informational disadvantage is likely to 
fade over time following improvements in language proficiency, extended social networks, 
and accumulation of cultural knowledge. In this case, wage assimilation arises as a result of 
immigrants catching up with natives in terms of information about jobs, and we would expect 
relative immigrant wage growth to primarily occur between rather than within jobs.
4  
Consequently, empirical evidence on immigrants’ wage growth between jobs relative 
to that of native workers can be used to sort out the relevance of statistical discrimination 
versus informational disadvantage of newcomers. Implications for within-job wage growth 
are, on the other hand, less clear-cut. The reason is that the existence of statistical 
discrimination may provide incentives for monopsonistic discrimination as well: Even if the 
current employer over time gains additional information about the productivity of their own 
workers, workers may not be able to cash in on the improved perceptions simply because the 
outside option lags behind. In the case of statistical discrimination, within-firm wage growth 
                                                 
4 Many job matches are facilitated by information from family, friends, or colleagues. Some studies indicate 
that social networks are particularly important for ethnic minorities, see, e.g., the discussion in Patacchini and 
Zenou (2008). Thus, smaller and less favorable networks may account for lower hiring rates among ethnic 
minorities (Reingold, 1999) even if the evidence is mixed. In a study that “delineates the various mechanisms 
by which minorities can be isolated from good job opportunities,” Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2006) find 
only scant evidence that network factors serve to limit employment opportunities of minorities.   4
is subject to two countervailing forces: increased information works towards a steeper wage 
profile, whereas lack of information on part of other employers will tend to keep wages low. 
 
2. Immigrant wage assimilation with firm effects and job mobility 
The standard economic assimilation study is based on a regression framework where, in one 
formulation, the log wage equation for immigrants is    
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where the log wage of immigrant worker i in year t depends on potential experience in the 
host country labor market or years since arrival (X), and age at the time of arrival (A0).
5 In 
equation (1), c is a vector of arrival cohort effects, π a vector of period effects, u denotes 
other factors, and Z captures covariates like educational attainment and the local 
unemployment rate. The log wage equation for native workers is  
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where X again denotes potential experience (or years since leaving school, defined as age-6-
the statutory years of schooling for the individual’s attainment), and Z represents other 
observed individual characteristics. Note that, because calendar year equals the sum of year 
of arrival and years since arrival, some restriction, such as the “equal period effect” 
assumption (
IN
tt    ), is necessary for identification of immigrant wage profiles and cohort 
effects (Borjas, 1995). We also include cohort effects for natives motivated by long-run 
effects of macroeconomic entry conditions or cohort size (Welch, 1979; Raaum and Røed, 
2006). To avoid perfect collinearity between cohort, age, and observation year, identification 
is based on the assumption that native cohort effects are equal within five-year intervals. For 
                                                 
5 Note that our model specification and notation differ somewhat from Borjas (1999) as we use “years since 
arrival” and “age at immigration,” rather than the more conventional “years since arrival” and “age,” in the set 
up. With controls for immigrant cohort, the two approaches are equivalent, even though the coefficient of the 
“year since arrival” term will represent different underlying parameters in the two formulations. Specifically, 
our g(X)-function captures what Borjas (p. 1719) denotes (δi + α), the sum of wage effects of aging and years 
since migration.   5
individual characteristics we distinguish between three educational groups, and the model is 
estimated based on the pooled samples with full sets of interaction terms for immigrants and 
natives, except for arrival cohort effects which are set common to immigrants with different 
education levels, and equal calendar year effects for natives and immigrants.
6  
Prior studies document earnings assimilation among immigrants during the first 10-15 
years of residency in Norway, e.g., Barth et al. (2004), and one of the empirical questions we 
address in the present paper is whether a similar pattern exists for hourly wages.    
 
2.1 Firm wage effects  
In our empirical analysis, we expand the wage residuals of equations (1) and (2) by 
introducing a firm-specific wage component ( f  ) common to all workers in the firm  
(3)  ,,
jj
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The ‘within-firm’ wage profiles of immigrant and native workers, estimated conditional on 
the firm fixed effect, will differ from the unconditional wage profiles if workers move to 
firms with a higher wage component over time. During the early years of the job career, 
search and job shopping are factors that are expected to lead to job mobility with positive 
wage gains. Job mobility caused by displacement or elapsed contracts are, on the other hand, 
less likely to involve wage gains. Our focus is whether and how the association between 
firm-fixed wage effects and (post-education) host-country experience differs between 
immigrants and natives. Different mobility patterns both in terms of job change rates and 
wage gains will give rise to differences in experience profiles by nativity.  
Matched employer-employee data with several worker records per firm are needed to 
estimate the firm fixed effect. In our empirical analysis, we rely on repeated cross-sectional 
data that allow for identification of firm fixed effects, but have limitations when it comes to 
accounting for unobserved individual worker heterogeneity. Thus, sorting on unobserved 
individual characteristics may bias our estimates of the firm fixed effect, for instance in the 
case of assortative matching (see, e.g., Abowd et al., 1999, and Shimer, 2005). Abowd et al. 
(2003) present evidence, however, that wage heterogeneity across firms, as reflected in the 
                                                 
6 Note however that the empirical model allows for differential effects of local labor market conditions by 
immigrant status, which relaxes the equal period effects assumption relative to the standard setup (see Bratsberg 
et al., 2006).   6
firm size effect on wages, is driven almost entirely by firm heterogeneity, and only very 
modestly by assortative matching of workers and firms. Abowd et al. (2009) furthermore 
show that the correlations between firm and individual fixed effects in their log wage 
regressions are “generally small in absolute value, ranging between about -0.20 and 0.25” (p. 
7), indicating that sorting on unobserved individual characteristics might be a minor concern. 
We therefore proceed with interpreting our estimated firm fixed effects as primarily 
reflecting true workplace heterogeneity, even though ideally a two-way fixed effects model 
would have been preferable.  
 
2.2 Sources of work experience  
Post-education experience differs for immigrants and natives as immigrants bring some of 
their labor market experience from abroad. Compared to natives, we would expect adult 
immigrants from developing countries to possess less relevant work experience due to 
generally high unemployment rates in their home country, time spent on the migration 
process, and, perhaps, their experiences as refugees. Moreover, the economic returns to any 
pre-migration work experience might be expected to be low because of different types of 
work and any qualifications obtained will, on average, be of limited value to employers in the 
host country (Friedberg, 2000). Comparing individuals of similar age and educational 
attainment, we would expect lower wages among immigrants because they have accumulated 
less relevant work experience and lack host-country specific skills. In our empirical model, 
the wage effects of foreign and host-country experience are assumed to be additive. Foreign 
work experience is captured by the “age at immigration” term and the g(X)-function will 
measure the returns to experience since migration.  
As immigrants spend time in the host country, they acquire competencies and 
qualifications from both work and leisure activities. One might expect that the broad part of 
immigrant labor market integration takes place through work. Time spent at work will 
involve accumulation of work-related skills, language competence through social interaction 
with native co-workers, on-the-job training activities, and so on.
7 To check for the 
importance of actual (versus potential) work experience, we construct for each individual a 
                                                 
7 This perspective is parallel to one explanation for the gender wage gap where women are penalized for years 
out of the labor force, see, e.g., Manning and Swaffield (2008).   7
measure of cumulative years with employment since the date of arrival.
8 Our simple test is to 
include cumulative years out of employment as a control variable in the empirical model, 
allowing for separate coefficients for natives and immigrants within educational groups.  
 
2.3 Seniority profiles and returns to job change 
Workers accumulate firm-specific qualifications as well as general human capital on the job. 
When workers are rewarded from staying with the same employer over time, whether 
because of returns to accumulation of firm-specific human capital (Becker, 1975) or from 
some type of deferred payment scheme (Lazear, 1981), native-immigrant wage differentials 
will arise if immigrants accumulate less firm-specific experience than natives (McDonald 
and Worswick, 1998), for example due to layoff selection based on “last in-first out” 
principles. If immigrants are less efficient in signaling their productivity, or face other types 
of statistical discrimination, returns to seniority might be higher for immigrants than for 
natives, as the employer has the advantage of observing individual skills more precisely 
(Farmer and Terrell, 1996).  
A key problem in identifying seniority wage profiles is that workers tend to stay 
longer at establishments that offer high wages for other reasons. We use the fixed 
establishment effect estimator that sweeps out time-invariant effects of other workplace 
attributes (Barth, 1997). As an implicit study of wage gains from job mobility, we analyze 
how the firm-specific wage component of each worker evolves over time, separately for 
natives and immigrants. We do this by estimating an auxiliary wage regression where the 
value of the firm wage effect serves as the dependent variable. In this model, a positive 
coefficient of experience will reflect returns to job search in terms of employment in better 
paying firms over time. This effect summarizes, of course, both the probability of job change 
and the wage gain from job change in a given year. If the estimate of the firm wage effect, as 
noted above, is influenced by unobserved individual characteristics, some caution is needed 
when interpreting this coefficient as it may reflect sorting of individuals into firms with high-
ability co-workers as well as into firms with a high pure firm-specific wage premium.  
                                                 
8 Although the dependent variable—the hourly wage—is observed between 1997 and 2006, we are able to 
match the wage data to individual annual earnings records from 1967 onwards for all workers. We use these 
records to construct a variable measuring cumulative employment simply defined as years with positive labor 
earnings.   8
3. Data 
Wages. Individual wage records are drawn from the annual Wage Statistics surveys, 
administered by Statistics Norway in September-October of each year. The data cover all 
sectors except for the primary industries and they are collected through stratified surveys 
(with complete coverage of public sector employees. Small establishments with fewer than 
five employees are not included. All large firms (more than 100-150 employees, depending 
on industry) are covered, while small (fewer than 25 to 50 employees, depending on 
industry) and medium sized firms have a sampling rate of 10-40 percent depending on 
industry. As the sampling of firms is annual, the data do not have a representative 
longitudinal structure. Firms that are included report wage information for all employees. 
Sampling weights are based on the inverse inclusion probability and post-stratification with 
regard to industry and employment at the date of the most recent census. The weights are 
additionally adjusted for any imbalances due to non-responses. Information is collected on 
basic paid salaries, fixed and variable additional allowances, bonuses and commissions, 
overtime pay as well as contractual and overtime working hours. We compute the hourly 
wage as the ratio of monthly pay—including variable allowances, bonuses, and commissions, 
but excluding overtime pay—to contractual hours worked during the survey month.   
Immigrant status. Information on immigrant status is drawn from the central 
population register and is linked to the pay record by means a personal identifier. We exclude 
from the analysis immigrants from rich developed countries in Europe, North America, and 
Oceania. These immigrant groups move frequently between countries with high return 
migration rates (Bratsberg et al., 2007) and have labor market outcomes in line with those of 
native workers (Barth et al., 2004).  Date of admission to Norway is used to define years 
since arrival and immigrant arrival cohort. Immigrants who arrived in Norway before age 16 
are excluded as they experienced part of their childhood in the host country and therefore 
expected to have a different wage profile than older immigrants. The majority of immigrants 
in our study are from developing countries, typically with refugee status or family 
reunification as the basis for residency in Norway.
9 
                                                 
9 Of the total immigrant flow to Norway from developing countries between 1990 and 2007, only four percent 
were admitted as labor immigrants, while 57 percent were admitted as refugees and  30 percent as part of a 
family reunification process (Statistics Norway, 2008).  9
Educational attainment. The Norwegian educational register contains, in principle, 
the educational attainment of all individuals living in Norway, based on reporting from 
domestic schools and universities and the agency that certifies education from abroad 
(“NOKUT”). As educational qualifications obtained abroad nonetheless often are missing, so 
is educational information for immigrants. To update the register Statistics Norway 
administered surveys in 1989 and 1999 to all resident immigrants without registered 
educational attainments at the time. Finally, the register will include self-reported attainment 
taken from the censuses of population when education data otherwise is missing. In this 
study, we include immigrants for whom education is missing in our analyses, but present 
results only for those with non-missing educational attainment throughout. The three groups 
are labeled low (less than 13 years of schooling; i.e., not completed the upper secondary 
level), medium (13-14 years), and high (more than 14 years) education.  
Age, gender, and sample period. Samples are restricted to male workers aged 20 to 65 
in the observation year; the observation period is 1997 to 2006.   
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics  
The core descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The average native-immigrant wage 
differential is 0.14 log point for the low educated group and even larger at 0.19 for the 
medium and 0.21 log point for the high education groups. Wages are increasing in 
educational attainment for both immigrants and natives, but the unadjusted education wage 
premium is greater for natives. Mean ages are fairly similar by nativity, except for the low 
education group where natives are much older (reflecting rising levels of education across 
native birth cohorts). For immigrants, age at entry is increasing in educational attainment, 
with group means ranging from 27 to 30 years of age. Within education group, there is hardly 
any difference in average attainment for immigrant and native workers in our sample.   
The average years since entry for immigrants is close to 13 years in each of the three 
education groups. Eastern Europeans constitute almost one quarter of the immigrant 
observations with Bosnia the major source country. Employees from Iran and Iraq are the 
largest country groups from the Northern Africa and Middle East region. Other Asia is the 
largest source region (31 percent of all immigrant observations), with Sri Lanka the main 
source country (9.8 percent of immigrant observations). Developing country immigrants are  10
definitely a minority in the Wage Statistics survey data, slightly overrepresented among 
workers with low education, and with shares between 2.0 and 3.6 percent of the sample. 
Immigrants are much more likely than natives to have immigrant co-workers; the average 
immigrant share of the establishment is about 2 percent for native workers and ranges from 
25 percent for high-education to 34 percent for low-education immigrant workers. 
 
 
Table 1. Sample means.  
  Low education Medium education High education  Educ
Variable  Imm  Native Imm Native Imm  Native  missing
Log hourly wage  4.81  4.95 4.87 5.06 5.04  5.25  4.85
Age  39.2  44.7 40.8 39.1 43.0  41.7  34.8
Age at entry  26.7    28.0   30.1    29.5
Years since entry  12.5    12.8   12.9    5.4
Years schooling  10.4  10.6 13.3 13.2 17.2  17.1   
Log local unempl  -3.72  -3.80 -3.74 -3.78 -3.73  -3.77  -3.69
Establishment 
immigrant share 
.343  .024 .272 .019 .246  .020  .427
Origin:         
Balkans  .172    .238   .119    .167
 Bosnia  .083    .132   .057    .056
Other East Europe  .034    .052   .133    .129
 Poland  .013    .026   .064    .071
N.Africa/M.East  .212    .199   .249    .290
 Iran  .036    .075   .115    .022
 Iraq  .054    .038   .045    .123
Other Africa  .115    .125   .148    .107
 Somalia  .040    .027   .018    .040
Other Asia  .403    .281   .259    .254
 Sri  Lanka  .138    .106   .057    .084
 Vietnam  .113    .062   .031    .017
South America  .063    .103   .092    .054
 Chile  .046    .080   .055    .025
         
Observations  49248  1311056 42105 1968568 29974  1489626  28082
Immigrant sample 
share 
.036  .021 .020    1
Note: Sample means are weighted using year-by-establishment sampling weights. There are a total of 90,189 
establishments in the sample. 
 
 
   11
4. Results  
The basic immigrant-native wage differentials over the sample period, conditional on 
educational attainment and controlling for calendar year of observation only, are presented in 
Table 2. As the first table entry shows, wages of low-educated immigrants from developing 
countries are on average 0.164 log point below native workers with similar educational 
attainment. When we split the immigrant sample by years since migration (YSM), we find 
that the wage gap is greater for recent (YSM < 10) than for non-recent immigrants, consistent 
with the proposition that immigrant accumulation of human capital with time in the new 
country results in wage assimilation. 
 
Table 2. Immigrant-native wage differentials.  
  Low education Medium education High education















        






























        
Firm fixed 
effects  
No  Yes No Yes No  Yes
Immigrant obs  49 248  42 105 29 974 
Native obs  1 311 056  1 968 568 1 489 626 
Controls  Calendar year fixed effects




The estimates with firm fixed effects show less dramatic patterns. When we account 
for time-invariant firm factors, the native-immigrant wage gap for less educated workers 
declines from 0.164 to 0.093 log point. For medium and high education workers, the drop is 
of a similar magnitude. In other words, more than 40 percent of the observed wage 
differential can be attributed to where immigrants (and natives) work. On average, 
immigrants work in low-paying firms.   12
From an assimilation perspective, it is of interest to read from the table that the 
reduction in the wage differential when controlling for firm fixed effects is largest for recent 
immigrants. Apparently, immigrants move into higher paying firms, and more similar to 
those of natives, as they spend time in the host country—an empirical pattern also uncovered 
in the recent studies of Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2010), 
both based on Canadian data. This conclusion is, however, premature, as any immigrant 
cohort heterogeneity is not accounted for in the table. In cross-sectional analyses, 
productivity differences across immigrant arrival cohorts and/or lasting effects of entry 
conditions will be reflected in the association between wages and YSM (Borjas, 1995; 
Åslund and Roth, 2007).  
 
4.1 Wage assimilation within and across establishments  
Figure 1 displays how the predicted wage, based on the coefficient estimates from the full 
synthetic panel model outlined in section 2, evolves with years since entry (YSM).
10 The 
upper panels show predicted log wages from the specification without firm fixed effects. The 
native profiles start at the median age of immigration, which is 25, 26, and 29 for the three 
education groups. The experience premium is relatively low for natives and amounts to about 
0.2 log point over the 25 year span, reflecting the compressed wage structure in Norway and 
its generally low returns to investments in human capital. Wages among immigrants grow 
with experience in Norway, but there is no convergence with native wages. Instead, the 
native-immigrant wage differential increases with additional years in the country. The 
widening gap arises from lower immigrant wage growth over the life cycle and this pattern is 
found for all education groups. The one exception is for highly educated immigrants, for 
whom wage growth beyond 15 years somewhat exceeds that of natives.  
Worker sorting across firms matters. The middle panels display predicted log wages 
from the specification with firm fixed effects, drawn separately for a native and an immigrant 
employee in an establishment with a weighted average firm wage effect.  For low and 
medium educated natives, wage growth with age is slightly lower in the “within-firm” panels 
than in the top panels, while the opposite is true for highly educated natives. Accounting for 
firm fixed effects reduces the native-immigrant wage differential for the relevant ranges of 
                                                 
10 Estimates from the complete model are listed in the Appendix, Table A1.    13
YSM and education: Comparing workers within the same establishment, immigrants and 
natives display relatively similar wage developments over time.  
 
Figure 1. Predicted wages as function of years since migration (YSM).  
 
Note: For natives, predicted wages are drawn as a function of age, starting at the median age of arrival for 
immigrants in the respective education group (25, 26, and 29). The upper panels are based on the standard 
model, while the middle panels are based on the firm fixed effects model. The lower panels stem from an 
auxiliary regression with the firm fixed effect expressed as a function of same explanatory variables as in the 
top panel and a linear time trend.  
 
 
When we account for differences in the distribution of workers across firms, the 
native-immigrant wage differential is reduced for all relevant values of YSM. Immigrants 
tend to be stuck in firms that pay below average wages. The last point is illustrated in the 
bottom panels of Figure 1. These panels display the predicted firm-specific wage component 
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auxiliary regression of the firm wage effect on the human capital variables included in the 
baseline specification and a time trend. Consider the middle panel, drawn for workers in the 
medium education bracket. The panel shows that the typical native worker in this education 
group starts out in a firm that pays an average wage, as the expected firm wage effect 
evaluated at YSM=0 is about zero. Over time this worker is predicted to advance to higher 
paying firms, after 25 years ending up in a firm paying seven percent above the average firm. 
The figure shows clear signs of worker sorting in the sense that employees with low 
education also tend to work in low-paying firms. This holds for both immigrants and natives. 
With the exception of highly educated middle-aged workers, natives move to higher paying 
firms with age.
11 For immigrants, the allocation across firms over the working career looks 
very different. For none of the three education groups is there any indication that immigrants 
move to better paying firms with time in Norway, as was suggested by the cross-sectional 
evidence described in Table 2. To reconcile the results of Table 2 and Figure 1, it is 
instructive to consider the estimated cohort effects from the wage equation, reported in 
appendix Table A1. These estimates reveal considerable permanent wage differences across 
entry cohorts, with higher wages for the cohorts that arrived during the 1960s and 1970s than 
those who arrived later. For example, immigrants who entered during the 1970s earn eight 
percent higher wages than the 1991-95 arrivals; see column 1. Columns 2 and 3 show that the 
source of this pay differential is that the early immigrants work in higher paying firms than 
the more recent arrivals, and that the favorable job affiliation is not the result of job mobility. 
What Figure 1 shows is that controlling for such differences across arrival cohorts effectively 
removes any trace of wage improvements from immigrant job mobility suggested by the 
unstandardized data.  
  Table 3 provides further details on the upper and middle panels of Figure 1, reporting 
the difference between the two wages profiles for selected values of YSM. To check for 
precision, the wage differentials are reported with standard errors. It is evident from the table 
that wages of immigrants are significantly below those of native workers with similar age 
and schooling. Based on the standard assimilation model without firm fixed effects (columns 
                                                 
11 The decline in the firm fixed effect for highly educated native workers after 10 years in the labor market is 
perhaps best understood in light of the increasing within-firm wages over time for this group. The figure shows 
that highly educated, middle-aged, native workers on average move to lower paying firms over time, but also to 
a higher paying position in those firms, ensuring an overall positive wage growth as displayed in the upper 
panel. These wage patterns are, in our view, worthy of a separate study.   15
1, 3, and 5), we find that wages of immigrants fall behind those of natives, and increasingly 
so for the low and medium educated, with time in the host country. After 20 years, the 
estimates for low and medium educated workers show that the native-immigrant wage 
differential has widened by about 0.10 log point since one year after entry. When we control 
for firm fixed effects (columns 2 and 4), the widening of the wage gap over time is much 
smaller—about 0.02-0.03 log point. For highly educated workers, the wage differential is 
larger and close to one third of the gap can be attributed to differences in the distribution of 
workers across firms. For the highly educated, the native-immigrant wage differential 
remains relatively stable with age at about 20 percent when we account for firm fixed effects. 
 
Table 3. Immigrant-native wage differential by years since migration. 
  Low education Medium education High education
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years since 
entry:  
      










































































No  Yes No Yes No  Yes
Controls  Cubic polynomials of age and YSM, interacted with educational attainment, immigrant 
cohort fixed effects, log local unemployment rate (plus interactions with attainment and 
immigrant), and calendar year fixed effects
Note: Immigrant cohort reference is the 1991-95 entry cohort, which turns out to be equal to the weighted 
average for all cohorts. Differentials are evaluated at average years of schooling of immigrants within groups. 
See also note to Figure 1.  
 
 
As in Figure 1, the main finding in Table 3 contradicts the assimilation pattern of 
immigrant movement into high-wage firms over time suggested by the simpler cross-
sectional approach of Table 2. Several repeated cross sections enable us to control for 
immigrant arrival cohort heterogeneity, and the discrepancy between findings underscores 
the importance of accounting for cohort differences in outcomes. When we control for  16
immigrant arrival cohort heterogeneity, we find no indication that immigrants on average 
move to higher paying firms with time in Norway.  
 
4.2 Years of work experience versus years since migration  
The lack of any wage convergence between immigrants and natives is puzzling as we expect 
foreign-borns to accumulate host-country specific human capital such as language skills over 
time. It is often argued that a substantial part of this learning process takes place at the 
workplace, adding to the overall human capital accumulation for both natives and immigrants 
through work. At the same time, prior evidence (e.g., Bratsberg et al., 2010) shows that 
immigrants are more frequently exposed to spells of unemployment and spend longer periods 
out of employment than natives. Table 4 displays the average number of years with 
employment by years since entry for immigrants and the corresponding age for natives. 
Employment is measured on the basis of annual earnings and a person is defined as 
employed if he earned positive labor earnings that year. According to the numbers in Table 4, 
immigrants do accumulate less experience through work but the difference is by no means 
dramatic. After 10 years, the average work experience differential between natives and 
immigrants is about 1.5 to 2 years across education groups. 
 
Table 4. Actual work experience of immigrant and native workers by years since entry.  
  Low education Medium education High education
Years since entry  Immigrants  Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants  Natives
1  0.65  0.80 0.68 0.78 0.70  0.77
5  3.66  4.74 3.82 4.74 4.08  4.71
10  7.69  9.67 7.90 9.68 8.20  9.63
Note: For natives, “years since entry” is measured as years since age 26, 27, and 29 for the three education 
groups, respectively. These ages correspond to the median age at immigration for the three immigrant groups.  
 
 
The weaker association between actual and potential work experience for immigrants, 
with the difference between YSM and actual work experience increasing in YSM, may 
explain why the wage profile with potential experience is less steep for immigrants than for 
natives. To check the implications for wage profiles we re-estimate the model including 
cumulative years out of employment as a control variable. Table 5, panel A, reports the 
marginal effect on wages of one year of absence from employment. With one exception (low 
education; no fixed effects), the evidence shows that a spell of non-employment has a more  17
negative effect on the wages of immigrants than natives, consistent with the idea that 
accumulation of human capital through work is particularly important for immigrants.
12  
 
Table 5. Effects of one year out of employment and the immigrant-native wage differential by 
years since migration controlling for years of non-employment. 
  Low education Medium education High education
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
A. Marginal effect of one year out of 
employment* 
    
























B. Wage differential by  
years since entry: 
    










































































No   Yes No  Yes No   Yes
Controls  Cubic polynomials of age, YSM, and years of non-employment, all interacted with 
educational attainment, immigrant cohort fixed effects, log local unemployment rate 
(plus interactions with attainment and immigrant), and calendar year fixed effects
*Evaluated at employed all years except one. 
 
 
Differential accumulation of actual work experience accounts for some, but not very 
much of the immigrant-native wage differential (see Table 5, panel B). For example, 
comparing the predicted wage differentials 15 years after entry in Tables 4 and 5, we see that 
accounting for actual experience reduces the differential in the standard model from -0.160 to 
                                                 
12 For native workers with medium and high education, estimates of the effect of one year of non-employment 
are (slightly) positive when the model does not account for firm wage effects. Since the estimates with firm 
fixed effects are negative, spells of non-employment may (in contrast to the results for immigrants) have a 
positive effect on establishment affiliation for natives with medium and high education. We do not have a good 
explanation for this result, but note that these groups are much less likely to have involuntary spells out of work 
than other workers, and we suspect that the positive returns may be due to education breaks, periods out of work 
in connection with geographic mobility, and the like.     18
-0.155 for low education, from -0.256 to -0.235 for medium education, and, finally, from -
0.293 to -0.258 for workers with high education. The impact of controlling for years out of 
employment is of similar magnitude for the estimated wage differentials based on the firm 
fixed effects model.  
  
4.3. Returns to seniority 
Even though wage profiles estimated with firm fixed effects are often labeled “within-firm” 
profiles, they do not distinguish between wage effects of firm-specific seniority and overall 
work experience. In a simple theoretical framework where workers accumulate both general 
and firm-specific human capital at the workplace we expect an extra compensation for 
workers who keep extended company with the same employer. Other theories emphasize 
incentives, insurance, and sorting as mechanisms behind wage policies with deferred 
compensation. From our wage differential perspective, immigrants are penalized if they have 
less seniority (e.g., due to shorter contracts and more frequent layoffs) or if their returns to 
firm-specific experience are lower than those of native workers.  
To investigate seniority effects on wages, we merge into the wage data information 
about the job spell taken from payroll records in the employee register.
13 The payroll records 
include information on the contract starting date that enables us to construct an individual 
seniority variable. In this section we present results from similar models as above, but 
augmented with a seniority term (cubic polynomial). Figure 2 displays the predicted seniority 
premiums for immigrants and natives by education and estimation method. According to the 
plots in the top panels (which do not account for firm wage effects), immigrants who stay in 
the same firm for ten years receive a wage premium of close to 9 percent. This premium 
partly reflects the fact that immigrant employees with high seniority work in firms that pay 
more, and the firm fixed effects estimates displayed in the lower panels indicate a ten-year 
seniority premium of about 5-6 percent for low and medium education workers and 3 percent 
for highly educated immigrants. When estimates of seniority returns fall as we include firm 
fixed effects in the empirical model, the indication is that the first set of estimates are 
upwardly biased from a positive correlation between seniority and the firm wage component. 
                                                 
13 The merge procedure led to a slight reduction in sample size—from 4,918,260 to 4,745,275 observations—
caused by some occurrences of non-matching employer identifiers in the two data sources.  19
As Figure 2 shows, accounting for this correlation is important when estimating seniority 
returns for immigrants in general as well as for highly educated native workers. Our 
preferred estimates for natives, based on the firm fixed effects model, reveal a premium close 
to 8 percent after 10 years, remarkably similar across education groups. For the highly 
educated group, immigrants earn significantly lower seniority returns than natives. But for 




Figure 2. Estimated seniority premiums. 
 
 
Our estimated seniority returns are in line with previous Norwegian studies like Barth 
(1997), but lower than estimates from U.S. studies, where, for example, the 11 percent 
premium after ten years reported by Altonji and Williams (2005) is in the lower range of a 
highly divergent literature. The comparison may however be as expected, in light of the less 
individualized wage setting in Norway than in the United States.  
                                                 
14 Evaluated at the mean level of seniority for immigrants (4 years), the null hypothesis of equal seniority 




























































































































   Even in cases where wage returns to seniority are similar for immigrants and natives, 
differences in layoffs and quits may generate differential seniority patterns by immigrant 
status. Since immigrants in our sample arrived as adults, they have on average had less time 
to accumulate seniority than natives. Table 6 reports average seniority by immigrant status 
and educational attainment.  For all educational groups, immigrants have substantially less 
seniority than natives. Seniority is decreasing in education for natives, reflecting differences 
in mobility rates and post-schooling years in the labor market. Table 6 also indicates that job 
change is more common among immigrants than natives. A striking pattern is that a much 
larger fraction of immigrant job change is involuntary as it is more likely for immigrants to 
experience an intermittent spell of unemployment between jobs.  
 
Table 6. Workplace seniority and involuntary job change of immigrants and natives.  
  Low education Medium education High education
  Immigrants  Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants  Natives
Seniority (years)  3.75  8.52 4.07 6.88 3.58  5.55
Share new job  .175  .075 .153 .088 .177  .126
Share involuntary         
 job  change  .554  .341 .438 .220 .293  .096
Note: “New job” is defined as less than six months on the current job and “share involuntary job change” the 
fraction of new employees who had registered with the unemployment service during the calendar year. 
 
 
In Figure 3 we display the predicted wage profiles based on a regression model where 
we also we control for seniority with the same employer.
15 Compared to Figure 1, the wage-
experience profiles plotted in Figure 3 do not change fundamentally. The native-immigrant 
wage differential is however lower when seniority controls are included (in addition to years 
of non-employment controls). Particularly for the low and medium education groups, the 
general pattern of divergence remains and is largely explained by the lack of immigrant 
mobility into better paying firms. Details on the immigrant-native wage differential are 
provided in Table 7, and the impact of seniority controls follows from a comparison with 
differentials listed in Table 5. Evaluated at 10 years of residence and based on the firm-fixed 
effects estimates, the differential drops (in absolute value) from -0.059 to -0.046 for the low 
education group. While the medium education differential changes from -0.115 to -0.099, the 
                                                 
15 The profiles are evaluated at a seniority level of zero; that is, they isolate cumulative market returns to 
experience.   21
largest impact is found for the highly educated, from -0.179 to -0.145, the group for whom 
immigrant returns to seniority fall significantly below those of native workers. 
 
Figure 3. Wage profiles estimated with controls for seniority and years of non-employment.   
 
 
In sum, differences in actual work experience and seniority explain a non-trivial part 
of the immigrant-native wage differential. Evaluated at 10 years since migration, the 
estimated within-firm differential for low educated workers is reduced from -0.064 (Table 3) 
to -0.046 (Table 7). For medium education, the differential goes from -0.128 to -0.099 and 
from -0.200 to -0.145 for the highly educated. All in all, about one quarter of the estimated 
immigrant-native wage differential that accounts for firm fixed effects (listed in Table 2) can 
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Table 7. Immigrant-native wage differential by years since migration, with controls for years 
of non-employment and seniority. 
  Low education Medium education High education
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years since 
entry:  
      










































































No  Yes No Yes No  Yes
Controls  Cubic polynomials of age, YSM, years of non-employment, and seniority, all 
interacted with educational attainment, immigrant cohort fixed effects, log local 
unemployment rate (plus interactions with attainment and immigrant), and calendar 
year fixed effects  
Note: See note to Table 3.  
 
 
4.4 Firm wage effects and the distribution of immigrants across establishments  
Immigrant workers are not only underrepresented in high-paying firms, but as in a recent 
study from Sweden (Åslund and Nordström Skans, 2010), they are overexposed to co-
workers of their own origin. On average, immigrants work in establishments where one 
quarter to one third of the workforce also are immigrants from low-income source countries, 
with the higher fraction for those with low education (see Table 1). Segregation of 
immigrants and natives across firms raises questions about the interpretation of the estimated 
firm wage effects. One concern is that any relation between the workplace immigrant share 
and the firm wage effect might differ for native and immigrant workers, with immigrants 
more penalized than natives from working in immigrant-intensive firms. Further, sorting of 
workers in terms of unobservable individual wage determinants will influence estimates of 
the firm wage effect, and such sorting may differ for natives and immigrants, e.g., when low-
ability immigrants are more likely than low-ability natives to work in firms with a high  23
immigrant share. In both cases, segregation of immigrants and natives across firms might 
lead us to overstate any negative wage effect of firms with many immigrant employees.   
To check whether our results are sensitive to such concerns, we re-estimate the model 
basing estimates of firm wage effects on native employees only. The top row of Figure 4 
displays the resulting wage profiles, after adjusting immigrant wages for native fixed firm 
effects. Apart from differences in intercepts, the YSM/experience profiles are remarkably 
similar for natives and immigrants with a steeper wage profile for more educated workers. 
The immigrant-native wage gap remains almost constant over time for all three education 
groups. When we adjust for the native fixed firm effect, the differential is about 9 percent for 
workers with low education, 11 percent for medium, and 14 percent for highly educated 
workers (see Table A2 for details).    
 
Figure 4. Predicted log wage and seniority profiles estimated with native fixed firm effects.   
 
 
The seniority profiles displayed in the bottom row of Figure 4 are very similar to 
those presented above and based on jointly estimated firm wage effects for natives and 















































































































































based on the sample of natives or on all workers.
16 Neither measure of the firm wage effect 
gives any indication that immigrant workers from developing countries over their career 
gradually enter firms where native workers enjoy high wages.  
 
5.  Discussion  
Our analyses show that wages of immigrants from developing countries over time do not 
converge to those of natives with similar educational attainment, but rather that native-
immigrant wage differentials increase with years in Norway. The divergence arises from 
lower, albeit positive, immigrant wage growth over the life cycle.
17 Our focus is whether the 
expanding native-immigrant wage gap is driven by differential wage growth within firms or 
by differences in wage gains from job mobility over the career.  
The evidence points to differences in the distribution of workers across firms as the 
key source of the widening wage gap. While native employees typically move to higher 
paying firms as they gain labor market experience, we fail to uncover evidence of such 
favorable job mobility for immigrants. In fact, for immigrants from developing countries the 
firm wage effect remains constant over the career. Even if our study is unable to pinpoint the 
exact mechanisms, the empirical evidence gives indications of the major causes of the 
observed differences in the role of job mobility.  
Variation in involuntary job separations and disproportional exposure to 
unemployment are potential explanations, as the nature of job mobility is important for the 
associated wage change. While many displaced workers must accept a wage cut in order to 
obtain a new job, see Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Ruhm (1991) as well as Huttunen et al. 
(2011) for a Norwegian study of income loss following displacement, direct job-to-job 
movements are more likely to involve a wage gain. Referring back to Table 6, we find that 
fully 17.5 percent of low-educated immigrant workers in the wage sample held a new job 
(i.e., had less than six months of seniority) and that more than half of these new job spells 
involved an intermittent period of registered unemployment. Indeed, the prevalence of 
                                                 
16 The correlation between the firm fixed effects estimated with and without immigrants included is above 0.99 
in the native sample and 0.87 in the immigrant sample.  
17 Barth et al (2004) show that the earnings gap between immigrants and natives in Norway, measured in terms 
of annual earnings, shrinks during the first ten years in the country. The fact that we do not find wage 
assimilation in terms of hourly wage in the present paper suggests that the annual earnings assimilation of 
immigrants observed in the prior study primarily is driven by rising relative employment and/or hours worked.  25
movements in and out of jobs in combination with periods of unemployment is three to four 
times higher among immigrant than native workers.  Hiring and firing policy based on “last 
in, first out” (LIFO) rules may explain why immigrants in general are more exposed to 
involuntary job separations. But as immigrants acquire work experience in Norway, we 
would expect them to take advantage of LIFO conventions and achieve protection from job 
loss similar to that of natives. The finding that wage gains from job mobility remain 
nonexistent even after 10 to 15 years in the host country cannot be explained by neutral LIFO 
rules.  
The lack of immigrant wage growth from job mobility is consistent with 
discrimination in hiring. When job offer arrival rates are lower for immigrants, whether due 
to taste-based or statistical discrimination by employers who are less precisely informed 
about the productivity of immigrant applicants,
18 wage gains from job mobility will be less 
frequent for immigrants than for native workers. The impact of less favorable outside 
opportunities caused by discrimination is likely to be reinforced by involuntary job 
separations and thereby create a regime where immigrants are trapped in low-paying jobs.  
Our results do not, on the other hand, indicate that limited information about job 
opportunities is a major reason for why immigrants are paid less than natives. Information 
disadvantages would be expected to fade and access to high-wage firms improve over time, 
which is contrary to what we find.  
Another key result is that, once we account for fixed firm effects, estimates of returns 
to seniority do not vary much between natives and immigrants, at least for workers with low 
and medium levels of educational attainment. This finding echoes results from the U.S. 
literature studying seniority returns by race (e.g., Bratsberg and Terrell, 1998). The empirical 
pattern debunks the explanation that differential accumulation of firm-specific human capital 
and differences in within-firm career opportunities are the sources of the widening wage gap. 
In a statistical discrimination framework, one could interpret differences in returns to 
seniority as indication of information asymmetries where employers update their information 
                                                 
18 In a recent study from Sweden, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) draw on fictitious job applications and show that 
ethnic minority applicants are less likely to receive callbacks from employers than applicants with equal 
qualifications and a Swedish-sounding name. Holden and Rosén (2009) show that, in a search framework with 
employment protection, the presence of some discriminating employers will sustain a labor market equilibrium 
where discriminated workers are subject to stricter hiring standards. 
  26
about true worker productivity. Even if such mechanisms imply higher seniority returns for 
immigrants, the relatively unfavorable evolvement of their outside option can be expected to 
weaken their bargaining position and counteract any additional wage growth from 
information updating.   
An implication of statistical discrimination in hiring is that immigrants will invest less 
time in on-the-job search and be less likely than their native co-workers to quit a job in a 
high-pay firm. This mechanism will generate a stronger correlation between the firm wage 
effect and on-the-job seniority among immigrant workers than natives. Our finding that 
accounting for firm fixed effects in the wage equation affects estimated seniority returns 
more for immigrants than for natives shows that seniority indeed relates more strongly to 
firm pay for immigrant workers, and lends further credence to the interpretation that 
immigrant job mobility is hampered by statistical discrimination.   
For highly educated workers, the seniority profile is less steep for immigrants than for 
natives. Highly educated immigrants are better paid and earn higher returns to general 
experience than immigrants with less schooling, but their returns to firm-specific experience 
are lower than for other immigrant groups as well as for natives. Limited transferability and 
lower quality of foreign education are two plausible explanations.  
Workplace segregation by ethnicity may explain why immigrants from developing 
countries do not move to higher paying firms over time. Our data show that immigrants tend 
to work in establishments with high immigrant employment shares, which is in line with 
recent evidence from Sweden presented by Åslund and Nordström Skans (2010) who further 
find that immigrant wages are lower for workers with a high number of immigrant 
colleagues. While workplace segregation in the Swedish study is “a phenomenon that 
diminishes but does not disappear with time in the host country” (p. 482), we find that the 
share of immigrant workers at the establishment is unrelated to years in Norway.
19 Even if 
neither study is designed to give the association between workplace immigrant shares and 
wages a causal interpretation, the absence of wage gains from job mobility uncovered in the 
present study fits well with the finding that the share of immigrant co-workers stays constant 
over time.   
                                                 
19 When we estimate a model with the immigrant workplace share as a function of all observed characteristics 
of the wage equation, we find no systematic association between the immigrant share and years since entry.   27
Recent studies of immigrant wages based on Canadian employer-employee data 
suggest that immigrants move into higher paying firms with time in the host country 
(Aydemir and Skuterud, 2008; Pendakur and Woodcock, 2010). At first glance, we too find 
evidence that this mechanism plays a role in the economic assimilation process of 
immigrants in Norway. But when we estimate wage profiles controlling for immigrant cohort 
differences, the finding of favorable immigrant job mobility disappears. Our results show that 
the early entry cohorts tend to work in better paying firms and that this advantage appears to 
be an attribute of the early arrival cohorts rather than a result of wage progress from job 
shopping.  
We present no direct evidence on why the early immigrant entry cohorts tend to work 
in better paying firms throughout their career. Their favorable job affiliations may be related 
to conditions in the labor market at the time of entry, for instance created by the high demand 
for manufacturing workers during the 1970s, or to the fact that there were very few 
immigrants from developing countries present in Norway at the time and therefore little 
segregation in the labor market. Alternatively, the pattern may reflect selection of firms and 
long-term survival of productive jobs along the lines of Jovanovic (1982), paired with higher 
rates of labor market withdrawal, or even return migration, among the early migrants who 
experienced job destruction (Bratsberg et al, 2010). Obviously, we cannot show that similar 
immigrant arrival cohort heterogeneity also drives the results in the Canadian studies, but the 
substantial differences in entry earnings among immigrants to Canada cited by Aydemir and 
Skuterud (2005) hint that this might be an issue.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We present evidence on the immigrant-native hourly wage differential in Norway by means 
of an extended assimilation regression framework in which wages are functions of 
experience, or years since migration for immigrants, accounting for firm fixed effects and 
arrival cohort heterogeneity. While economic assimilation studies typically find that earnings 
of immigrants initially grow faster than those of natives, we find that hourly wages of 
immigrants from developing countries grow over time, but fail to match the growth of native 
wages over the life cycle. An initial wage gap at entry expands with years in the host country.   28
When we account for differences in returns to and patterns of job mobility with firm 
fixed effects, we find that about 40 percent of the native-immigrant wage gap is due to the 
fact that immigrants work and stay in low-paying firms. Immigrants appear to be stuck in 
firms that pay below average wages. Natives, in particular those with low and medium levels 
of educational attainment, typically work in establishments with pay below the firm average 
during early stages of their career and then proceed to improve their relative position in the 
hierarchy of establishments. Immigrants too tend to start their host-country career in low-
paying establishments, but fail to advance to higher paying firms over time.  
Controlling for heterogeneity in firm pay, our results show that immigrant and native 
workers earn similar cumulative returns to host-country labor market experience. Further, at 
least for low and medium education workers, we find no evidence of differences in 
immigrant and native returns to firm seniority. These empirical patterns discredit such 
explanations as lack of information about the host-country labor market and its job 
opportunities, language barriers, limited access to native networks, and inferior promotions 
as major sources of differences in life cycle wage growth of immigrants and natives. Instead, 
our empirical evidence is consistent with persistent statistical discrimination in hiring as an 
important driver of the widening native-immigrant wage gap. Immigrants face less favorable 
options outside their own workplace and the negative impacts on wage gains from job 
mobility are reinforced by their higher rate of involuntary job separations.   29
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Detailed regression results.  
            
 
 
Baseline Specification (Fig. 1)  Extended Specification (Figs. 2 and 3) 
Dependent variable:  Log Hourly Wage  Firm 
Wage 
Effect 
















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
Low educ*Years  0.015  0.012  0.003  0.012  0.010  0.002 
 since  entry  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Low educ*Years  -0.028  -0.025  -0.003  -0.024  -0.020  -0.005 
 since  entry
2/100 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Low educ*Years  -0.004  0.004 -0.009 -0.005 0.002  -0.006
 since  entry
3/10,000 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Medium educ  -0.043  -0.068  0.025  -0.054  -0.080  0.021 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Medium educ*Years  0.020  0.016  0.004  0.017  0.013  0.003 
 since  entry  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Medium educ*Years  -0.048  -0.037  -0.010  -0.034  -0.025  -0.009 
 since  entry
2/100 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Medium educ*Years  0.033  0.025  0.008  0.011  0.008  0.003 
 since  entry
3/10,000 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
High educ  -0.057  -0.121  0.064  -0.090  -0.129  0.062 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
High educ*Years  0.032  0.027  0.005  0.027  0.025  0.004 
 since  entry  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
High educ*Years  -0.145  -0.085  -0.060  -0.123  -0.076  -0.056 
 since  entry
2/100 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
High educ*Years  0.204  0.093  0.111  0.173  0.084  0.102 
 since  entry
3/10,000 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Immigrant*Low educ  -0.112  -0.072  -0.039  -0.076  -0.039  -0.039 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Imm*Low educ*Years  0.003  0.004  -0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.001 
 since  entry  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Imm*Low educ*Years  -0.062  -0.037  -0.025  -0.038  -0.024  -0.019 
 since  entry
2/100 (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
Imm*Low educ*Years  0.130  0.067  0.063  0.098  0.049  0.053 
 since  entry
3/10,000 (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Imm*Medium educ  -0.208  -0.134  -0.074  -0.170  -0.100  -0.065 
 (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Imm*Med educ*Years  -0.005  0.002  -0.006  -0.007  0.001  -0.006 
 since  entry  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Imm*Med educ*Years  -0.012  -0.030  0.017  -0.006  -0.030  0.012 
 since  entry
2/100 (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
Imm*Med educ*Years  0.050  0.071  -0.020  0.052  0.075  -0.006 
 since  entry
3/10,000 (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.016) 
Imm*High educ  -0.331  -0.193  -0.138  -0.258  -0.138  -0.136 
 (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.010)  34
Imm*High educ*Years  -0.009  -0.005  -0.004  -0.007  -0.004  -0.001 
 since  entry  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002)
Imm*High educ*Years  0.052  0.015  0.037  0.036  0.004  0.023 
 since  entry
2/100 (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.012) 
Imm*High educ*Years  -0.064  0.009  -0.073  -0.029  0.036  -0.048 
 since  entry
3/10,000 (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.038)  (0.033)  (0.024) 
Educ missing (imm)  -0.055  -0.030  -0.025  -0.015  0.009  -0.026 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Educ missing*Years  0.014  0.012  0.002  0.012  0.010  0.002 
 since  entry  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Educ missing*Years  -0.072  -0.024  -0.048  -0.064  -0.013  -0.050 
 since  entry
2/100 (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Educ missing*Years  0.112  -0.014  0.127  0.107  -0.025  0.128 
 since  entry
3/10,000 (0.054)  (0.043)  (0.033)  (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.035) 
Low educ*Age  0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.000 
 at  entry  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Low educ*Age  0.000  0.002  -0.002  0.002  0.003  -0.002 
 at  entry
2/100 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Low educ*Age  -0.005  -0.006  0.002  -0.005  -0.007  0.002 
 at  entry
3/10,000 (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.013) 
Medium educ*Age  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000 
 at  entry  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Medium educ*Age  0.001  -0.004  0.005  0.004  -0.001  0.006 
 at  entry
2/100 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Medium educ*Age  -0.039  -0.001  -0.038  -0.044  -0.012  -0.035 
 at  entry
3/10,000 (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.017) 
High educ*Age  0.002  0.006  -0.004  0.001  0.005  -0.004 
 at  entry  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000)
High educ*Age  0.016  0.021  -0.005  0.010  0.020  -0.008 
 at  entry
2/100 (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
High educ*Age  -0.038  -0.087  0.049  -0.002  -0.069  0.061 
 at  entry
3/10,000 (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.027)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.027) 
Educ missing*Age  0.005  0.004  0.001  0.005  0.005  0.001 
 at  entry  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Educ missing*Age  -0.022  -0.006  -0.016  -0.022  -0.007  -0.015 
 at  entry
2/100 (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Educ missing*Age  0.096  0.042  0.055  0.099  0.040  0.059 
 at  entry
3/10,000 (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.021) 
Years of schooling  0.052  0.047 0.005 0.053 0.048  0.005
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Immigrant*Years of   0.011  0.004  0.007  0.009  0.003  0.007 
 schooling  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Arrived before 1966  0.209  0.090  0.120  0.194  0.088  0.113 
 (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.017) 
Arrived 1966-70  0.166  0.047  0.120  0.146  0.035  0.116 
 (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Arrived 1971-75  0.086  -0.008  0.095  0.072  -0.015  0.091 
 (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Arrived 1976-80  0.075  -0.004  0.079  0.063  -0.010  0.075 
 (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Arrived 1981-85  0.036  -0.014  0.050  0.031  -0.017  0.048 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Arrived 1986-90  -0.023  -0.027  0.005  -0.020  -0.027  0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Arrived 1996-2000  -0.033  -0.012  -0.021  -0.039  -0.019  -0.020 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  35
Arrived 2001-05  -0.046  -0.005  -0.042  -0.053  -0.014  -0.040 
 (0.005)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004)
Native entry before 1966  -0.010  0.002  -0.013  -0.013  -0.006  -0.007 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Native entry 1966-70  0.000  0.010  -0.010  -0.001  0.004  -0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Native entry 1971-75  -0.005  0.009  -0.014  -0.006  0.005  -0.011 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Native entry 1976-80  0.004  0.013  -0.009  0.004  0.011  -0.007 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Native entry 1981-85  0.008  0.014  -0.006  0.007  0.013  -0.005 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Native entry 1986-90  0.003  0.009  -0.006  0.002  0.008  -0.006 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Native entry 1996-2000  -0.023  -0.017  -0.007  -0.023  -0.016  -0.007 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Native entry 2001-05  -0.069  -0.051  -0.019  -0.065  -0.052  -0.014 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Year 1998  0.072  0.067    0.073  0.068   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Year 1999  0.107  0.099    0.109  0.101   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Year 2000  0.152  0.144    0.155  0.147   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Year 2001  0.194  0.188    0.198  0.190   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Year 2002  0.249  0.240    0.256  0.242   
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year 2003  0.280  0.266    0.286  0.268   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Year 2004  0.312  0.298    0.320  0.299   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Year 2005  0.343  0.332    0.351  0.332   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Year 2006  0.384  0.371    0.393  0.372   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Low educ*ln(local  -0.015  -0.008  -0.006  -0.014  -0.008  -0.006 
 unemployment)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Medium educ*ln(local -0.020  -0.014 -0.005 -0.019 -0.014  -0.004
 unemployment)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
High educ*ln(local  -0.012  -0.005  -0.006  -0.009  -0.004  -0.005 
 unemployment)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Imm*Low educ*ln(local  0.005  0.012  -0.006  0.002  0.007  -0.006 
 unemployment)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Imm*Med educ*ln(local  0.005  0.009  -0.004  0.002  0.007  -0.006 
 unemployment)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Imm*High educ*ln(local  -0.003  0.003  -0.006  -0.011  -0.001  -0.009 
 unemployment)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Educ missing*ln(local  0.004  0.005  -0.000  0.003  0.004  0.001 
 unemployment)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Trend     0.001      0.002 
     (0.000)      (0.000) 
Low educ*        0.014  0.012   
 Seniority        (0.000)  (0.000)   
Low educ*        -0.070  -0.061   
 Seniority
2/100       (0.002)  (0.001)    36
Low educ*        0.108  0.093   
 Seniority
3/10,000   (0.003) (0.003) 
Medium educ*        0.015  0.016   
 Seniority        (0.000)  (0.000)   
Medium educ*        -0.098  -0.097   
 Seniority
2/100       (0.002)  (0.002)   
Medium educ*        0.168  0.164   
 Seniority
3/10,000     (0.005)  (0.004)   
High educ*        0.030  0.016   
 Seniority        (0.000)  (0.000)   
High educ*        -0.208  -0.105   
 Seniority
2/100       (0.003)  (0.002)   
High educ*        0.403  0.196   
 Seniority
3/10,000     (0.007)  (0.005)   
Imm*Low educ*        0.004  0.000   
 Seniority        (0.001)  (0.001)   
Imm*Low educ*        -0.027  -0.016   
 Seniority
2/100       (0.013)  (0.009)   
Imm*Low educ*        0.027  0.033   
 Seniority
3/10,000     (0.031)  (0.022)   
Imm*Medium educ*        0.008  -0.001   
 Seniority        (0.002)  (0.001)   
Imm*Medium educ*        -0.072  -0.004   
 Seniority
2/100       (0.019)  (0.015)   
Imm*Medium educ*        0.163  0.013   
 Seniority
3/10,000     (0.051)  (0.041)   
Imm*High educ*        -0.008  -0.011   
 Seniority    (0.003) (0.002) 
Imm*High educ*        0.038  0.090   
 Seniority
2/100       (0.032)  (0.024)   
Imm*High educ*        -0.053  -0.250   
 Seniority
3/10,000     (0.094)  (0.070)   
Low educ*        -0.003  -0.002  -0.001 
  Years w/o emp        (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Low educ*        0.026  0.016  0.011 
  Years w/o emp
2/100       (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Low educ*        -0.049  -0.037  -0.014 
  Years w/o emp
3/10,000       (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Medium educ*    0.005 -0.000  0.006
  Years w/o emp        (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Medium educ*        -0.046  0.003  -0.054 
  Years w/o emp
2/100       (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Medium educ*        0.092  -0.017  0.117 
  Years w/o emp
3/10,000       (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
High educ*        0.003  -0.006  0.008 
  Years w/o emp        (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
High educ*        -0.071  0.035  -0.101 
  Years w/o emp
2/100       (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
High educ*        0.221  -0.046  0.257 
  Years w/o emp
3/10,000       (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
Imm*Low educ*        0.004  -0.002  0.005 
  Years w/o emp        (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Imm*Low educ*        -0.063  0.009  -0.065 
  Years w/o emp
2/100       (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Imm*Low educ*        0.180  0.006  0.160 
  Years w/o emp
3/10,000       (0.053)  (0.044)  (0.043)  37
Imm*Medium educ*        -0.017  -0.008  -0.010 
  Years w/o emp    (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)
Imm*Medium educ*        0.149  0.060  0.102 
  Years w/o emp
2/100       (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
Imm*Medium educ*        -0.309  -0.082  -0.257 
  Years w/o emp
3/10,000       (0.096)  (0.075)  (0.096) 
Imm*High educ*        -0.028  -0.014  -0.016 
  Years w/o emp        (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Imm*High educ*        0.325  0.143  0.201 
  Years w/o emp
2/100       (0.041)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
Imm*High educ*        -0.821  -0.354  -0.505 
  Years w/o emp
3/10,000       (0.120)  (0.085)  (0.090) 
Constant 4.586  4.638  -0.049  4.558  4.613  -0.049 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sample sizes are 4,918,260 in columns (1)-(3) and 4,745,275 
in columns (4)-(6). The model in column (2) includes 90,189 firm fixed effects and that in column (5) 88,884 
firm fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using sampling weights for the firm. Constant terms are evaluated 
at median age at arrival (26, 27, and 29 for the three education groups, respectively), compulsory schooling 





Table A2. Immigrant-native wage differential by years since migration, with controls for 
years of non-employment, seniority and native fixed firm effects.   
  Low education Medium education High education
Years since entry:   (1)  (2)  (3) 
1 -0.083 
(0.010) 
-0.114 
(0.010) 
-0.145 
(0.015) 
5 -0.081 
(0.007) 
-0.108 
(0.007) 
-0.144 
(0.009) 
10 -0.084 
(0.007) 
-0.111 
(0.007) 
-0.145 
(0.009) 
15 -0.090 
(0.008) 
-0.112 
(0.008) 
-0.144 
(0.009) 
20 -0.097 
(0.010) 
-0.124 
(0.009) 
-0.137 
(0.010) 
25 -0.101 
(0.012) 
-0.123 
(0.011) 
-0.119 
(0.013) 
 